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THE REPLACEMENTS: CONFLICTING 
STANDARDS FOR OBTAINING NEW COUNSEL 
UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
SHARON FINEGAN* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2006, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez emphasizing the importance of a defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice under the Sixth Amendment and holding a denial of this right constitutes 
structural error, requiring automatic reversal. Following that decision, several federal 
circuit courts and state appellate courts have questioned how to apply this right to 
circumstances where the right to choice of counsel and the right to appointed counsel 
overlap. When a defendant seeks to replace retained counsel for appointed counsel, 
should the standard governing his motion fall under the right to choice of counsel? 
Or should such the motion fall within the purview of the right to appointed counsel? 
Despite the fact that defendants have sought to replace retained counsel with 
appointed counsel for decades, the Supreme Court has never established a clear 
standard to apply under these circumstances. Because of this lack of guidance, lower 
courts have split on the standard to apply in these circumstances. 
As recently as April 2016, the Eleventh Circuit held that the right to choice of 
counsel standard should govern and that a defendant need not show any cause to 
support his request to substitute retained counsel. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the First Circuit’s standard that a defendant must demonstrate good cause to 
succeed in a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel. 
In order to resolve the conflicting standards employed by the lower courts, a 
clear rule needs to be established to both protect the defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice and preserve judicial efficiency and fairness to all participants in the trial 
process. By adopting the Eleventh and Ninth Circuit standard that a defendant need 
not demonstrate good cause in order to replace his retained attorney, the Court would 
provide a clear rule that would protect the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel 
of choice. At the same time, the defendant’s right to choice of counsel should be 
considered a rebuttable presumption. The Court should allow the presumption in 
favor of counsel of choice to be overcome by a trial court’s factual findings that a 
motion to substitute would lead to delays that would cause unfairness or perceived 
unfairness, or would unduly inconvenience participants in the trial process. By 
establishing this rebuttable presumption, the Court would provide clear guidance to 
lower courts struggling to ensure efficiency while at the same time protecting a 
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.”1 The right of a defendant to be represented by counsel is 
fundamental to the American system of justice.2 In the U.S. adversarial system, the 
State and the defendant are engaged in a contest to determine the defendant’s guilt. 
However, the power of the State far outweighs that of an individual defendant.3 In 
order to ensure a fair and just result, procedural rules limit the evidence that can be 
introduced and attempt to level the playing field.4 Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
defendants are incapable of understanding, let alone enforcing, these procedural 
                                                          
 1  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2  Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered 
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 35 (1991) (“The rights delineated in the amendment are 
meant to equalize the balance of power in the criminal process by granting the defendant an 
indispensable shield against the natural advantage the prosecution enjoys in a criminal trial.”); 
Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: The Obligation of the Courts to Enforce the Right 
to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 168 (2012) (“[T]hose who founded this 
country held the right to counsel in the highest of reverence.”). 
 3  Briggs J. Matheson, The Sixth Amendment Twilight Zone: First-Tier Review and the 
Right to Counsel, 3 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 441, 446 (2014); see also Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (noting the “vast sums of money” spent by states to 
prosecute criminal defendants, requiring the appointment of counsel to ensure that defendants 
can “stand[] equal before the law”). 
 4  Matheson, supra note 3, at 446. 
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rules.5 Thus, to ensure the fairness of the system, it is crucial that defendants have 
counsel to adequately protect their rights.6   
The broad language of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to encompass 
several fundamental rights involving a criminal defendant’s right to an attorney.7 
These rights include the right to effective counsel, the right to an appointed counsel 
when the defendant is indigent, and the right to choice of counsel.8 The latter two 
rights have generally been addressed independently.9 Issues that arise with the right 
to choice of counsel are governed by different standards than issues that arise 
regarding an indigent defendant’s right to appointed counsel.10 Yet, under certain 
circumstances, these two rights can intertwine and, indeed, conflict. 
Imagine a criminal case that is about to go to trial. The defendant has been 
represented by retained counsel throughout the pretrial process but, prior to the start 
of trial, seeks to substitute his retained attorney for a court-appointed attorney. This 
request could be the result of a breakdown in communications between the retained 
attorney and her client, a conflict of interest, a lack of financial resources, or simply 
a desire to delay the start of trial. At this point, the trial judge must balance the 
defendant’s right to counsel of choice with both his right to appointed counsel and 
the need for fair and efficient administration of justice.11 There are well-established 
rules governing the standard applicable to indigent defendants seeking to replace 
their appointed counsel with new appointed counsel.12 Likewise, the Supreme Court 
has established standards to apply when a defendant seeks to replace his retained 
                                                          
 5  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment 
“embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have 
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to 
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned 
counsel”).  
 6  Id. at 463 (“The ‘right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.’”) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 
(1932)). 
 7  United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 8  Id. 
 9  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006) (noting that to combine 
analysis of the two rights would “confuse the right to counsel of choice—which is the right to 
a particular lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective 
counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen 
or appointed”). 
 10  United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 11  See, e.g., Com. v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Mass. 1985) (“When the defendant 
seeks a continuance to substitute counsel at or near the time of trial, the judge must balance 
the defendant’s right to choose his counsel with the interests of the court, the public, the 
victim, and the witnesses. There is no easy, mechanical test that the judge can apply in 
balancing these interests.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 12  United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Although an indigent 
criminal defendant has a right to be represented by counsel, he does not have a right to be 
represented by a particular lawyer, or to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good 
cause.”). 
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counsel with newly retained counsel.13 However, the Court has yet to provide clear 
guidance on a standard to apply to a motion to substitute counsel when a defendant 
seeks to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel. 
Because of this lack of guidance, lower courts have struggled to determine which 
standards apply in granting the defendant’s right to substitute counsel.14 Some courts 
emphasize the constitutional significance of the defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice and place little burden on the defendant to show why he wishes to substitute 
counsel.15 Other courts have required defendants to show good cause as to why the 
retained counsel should be substituted.16 Still, other courts have dealt with this 
challenge by focusing on the discretion trial judges have in granting continuances 
and use that discretion to limit a defendant’s ability to substitute counsel.17   
This Article will examine the conflict regarding the standard applicable to choice 
of counsel and the merits of the various ways courts address the rights conferred by 
the Sixth Amendment. The Article first addresses the different rights established by 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Article then examines the various court 
rulings that have addressed this conflict. Finally, the Article analyzes these standards 
and provides a procedure that would resolve these conflicting lines of authority 
while preserving the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to ensure fairness and 
efficiency in the trial process. 
II. RIGHTS AFFORDED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
One criminal procedure scholar has noted, “[T]here appears to be but a single 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”18 However, this single right encompasses both 
the right to retained counsel of choice and the right to appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants.19 Further, the rights to appointed counsel and counsel of choice have 
been held to be distinct and independent of one another.20   
The reason these rights are evaluated independently stems from the different 
derivations of these rights. The right to choice of counsel is derived from the 
recognition that “[r]epresentation by counsel would usually be of great value to the 
defendant” and the acknowledgment of the importance of a defendant’s freedom to 
                                                          
 13  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147-48; Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 
(1988). 
 14  United States v. Jiminez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 
Com., 474 N.E.2d at 542 (stating that there is not “an all-inclusive list of factors for the judge 
to consider” and that “the judge must blend an appreciation of the inevitable difficulties of 
trial administration with a concern for constitutional protections”). 
 15  See, e.g., Jiminez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271; United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 
976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 16  See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 812 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 17  See, e.g., Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2009); State v. Andrews, 249 P.3d 
912, 171 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 18  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1 (5th ed. 2009) (hereinafter 
LAFAVE). 
 19  Id. 
 20  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006). 
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choose the manner of representation that would best suit his defense.21 The right to 
appointed counsel for indigent defendants is derived from the need to ensure a fair 
trial and achieve a just result in all criminal cases, not just cases where a defendant 
can afford to hire counsel.22 While these two rights generally coincide and need not 
conflict, there are times when they overlap and create confusion for trial courts and 
attorneys alike. 
Perhaps the most well known of the rights that fall under the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel is the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Familiarity 
with this right likely stems from its use in Miranda warnings and the large number 
of indigent criminal defendants who cannot afford to hire private attorneys.23 
However, the right to appointed counsel has not always been interpreted as a right 
granted to all indigent defendants under the Constitution. It was not until 1932, in 
Powell v. Alabama, that the Supreme Court first determined that criminal defendants 
are entitled to appointed counsel in certain federal cases.24 Moreover, it was not until 
30 years after Powell, in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, that the 
Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment conferred a right to counsel upon indigent 
criminal defendants in both state and federal criminal proceedings.25 Gideon 
emphasized the fundamental importance of the right to counsel in our adversarial 
system of justice.26 Quoting an earlier case, the Court stated that “[The assistance of 
counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to 
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty . . . The Sixth Amendment stands 
as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, 
justice will not ‘still be done.’”27  
This right does not, of course, mean that defendants are afforded counsel in all 
criminal proceedings.28 Since Gideon, the right to appointed counsel has been limited 
in many respects:29 for example, there is no constitutional right to counsel before the 
                                                          
 21  LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.1. 
 22  Id. (“[N]o Sixth Amendment distinction should exist between the indigent and affluent 
defendant as to their basic right to be represented by counsel; both obviously are entitled to a 
fair hearing.”). 
 23  Edward L. Fiandach, Miranda Revisited, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 22, 26; see also 
John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the System or the Client?, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 80 (1995) (noting that while “[s]tatistics are not maintained on the 
percentage of federal defendants represented by appointed counsel” “[t]hree out of every four 
defendants charged with a serious crime are unable to afford counsel”).  
 24  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 25  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). 
 26  Id. at 344 (“[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system 
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). 
 27  Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)) (alterations in 
original).  
 28  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that the Constitution does not require 
counsel to be appointed in petty cases that do not result in imprisonment). 
 29  See Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and 
Adversarial Systems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 499 (2009).  See, e.g., United States 
v. Parker, 469 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the right to counsel does not guarantee 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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initiation of formal criminal charges,30 nor is there a constitutional right to counsel 
after the first direct appeal of a case.31  Another way in which the right to appointed 
counsel is indirectly limited is the ability of a defendant to choose, or fire, an 
appointed attorney.32 The Court has found that a criminal defendant does not have 
the right to choose his attorney when he seeks court-appointed counsel.33 A 
defendant must accept the court’s appointed attorney and typically has little to no 
influence over the choice of that attorney.34 This does not mean that a defendant can 
never successfully replace one court-appointed counsel with another.35 Instead, the 
defendant must meet the high standard set by the courts in order to prevail on his 
motion to substitute counsel.36   
A defendant can only successfully move to replace court-appointed counsel when 
he can demonstrate “good cause” for the substitution.37 An example of “good cause” 
to substitute counsel can be found when a defendant can demonstrate that his 
attorney has an actual conflict of interest.38 In such a case, the defendant has shown 
good cause to replace that attorney with another appointed counsel.39 The burden is 
                                                                                                                                         
the right to the same attorney throughout the proceedings); United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 
930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the right to counsel does not guarantee the right to a 
“friendly and happy attorney-client relationship”); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 
1985) (noting that the right to counsel does not afford criminal defendant’s the right to 
confidence in appointed counsel).  
 30  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (“[I]t has been firmly established that a 
person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time 
that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.”). 
 31  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (holding that a state need not provide a 
defendant with counsel in his discretionary appeal to the high court of the state). 
 32  Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that an indigent 
defendant who is eligible for appointed counsel “does not have a right to have a particular 
lawyer represent him, nor demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 33  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006) (“[T]he right to counsel of 
choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”). 
 34  Utah v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121-22 (Utah 1986) (“The right to counsel does 
not include the right of a defendant to designate his own court-appointed counsel by either the 
process of an affirmative demand or the selective elimination of other attorneys.”); May v. 
State, 62 P.3d 574, 584 (Wyo. 2003); see LAFAVE, supra note 18, at §11.4(a) (“[T]he initial 
selection of counsel to represent an indigent is a matter resting within the almost absolute 
discretion of the trial court.”). 
 35  Wainwright, 767 F.2d at 742. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. (quoting McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Good cause for 
substitution of counsel cannot be determined ‘solely according to the subjective standard of 
what the defendant perceives.’”)). 
 38  United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 39  Id. Other ways in which the defendant can show “good cause” for substitution are a 
“complete breakdown in communication” with his attorney or “an irreconcilable conflict 
which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. 
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on the defendant, in these circumstances, to show why the replacement is 
constitutionally necessary and required to ensure a fair trial.40 Thus, while the right 
to appointed counsel for indigent defendants is a significant and weighty entitlement, 
it is restricted in many important ways. 
The standards by which the right to choice of counsel is evaluated differ from the 
standards used to evaluate a defendant’s right to appointed counsel. The courts have 
interpreted the language of the Sixth Amendment to grant to defendants the right to 
counsel of their choosing.41 Although this right is subject to some limitations,42 the 
right to choice of counsel essentially means that a defendant can hire any attorney 
who is willing and able to represent him.43 The right to choice of counsel also means 
that a defendant is able to fire his retained counsel for any reason.44 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice 
requires the defendant be permitted to hire the attorney “he believes to be best.”45 
This right creates a “presumption” in favor of a defendant’s right to retain the 
attorney of his choosing.46   
Just as the right to appointed counsel is not without limitation, so too is the right 
to choice of counsel, as the right has also been restricted in several important ways.47 
Regardless of his selection, a defendant cannot choose counsel who is not a member 
of the bar or is not admitted to practice in the court where the defendant is being 
tried.48 Nor may a defendant “insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford 
                                                          
 40  Indeed, “[a] defendant must do more than show that he or she does not have a 
‘meaningful relationship’ with his or her attorney” in order to meet the “heavy burden” of 
showing good cause for substituting his appointed attorney. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
 41  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). 
 42  “The Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in several 
important respects. Regardless of his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member of 
the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in court. Similarly, a defendant may not 
insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to 
represent the defendant. Nor may a defendant insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a 
previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the 
Government.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 
 43  Utah v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). 
 44  Id. at 1234 (“Assuming that incoming counsel is willing and ethically available, a 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to fire retained counsel and hire new retained counsel 
irrespective of the defendant’s reasons for doing so, so long as the substitution does not 
unreasonably disrupt the proceedings.”); see also United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 
976 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Unless the substitution would cause significant delay or inefficiency or 
run afoul of the other considerations we have mentioned, a defendant can fire his retained or 
appointed lawyer and retain a new attorney for any reason or no reason.”).    
 45  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146. 
 46  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. 
 47  Id. at 159; see also Keith Swisher, Disqualifying Defense Counsel: The Curse of the 
Sixth Amendment, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 374, 388 (2014) (“[I]n light of 
countervailing interests—which are indeed present in the majority of cases—the rights to 
counsel of choice or to waive conflict-free counsel may well fail to prevent disqualification.”). 
 48  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
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or who for other reasons declines to represent the defendant.”49  Further, a defendant 
cannot choose “an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship with an 
opposing party, even when the opposing party is the government.”50 But aside from 
these general restrictions concerning an attorney’s eligibility to represent a particular 
defendant, the right to counsel of choice has been vigorously guarded as a 
fundamental protection under the Sixth Amendment.51  
It should be noted that overarching both the right to appointed counsel and the 
right to retained counsel of choice is the requirement that counsel provide “effective 
assistance” to the defendant.52 Regardless of whether a defendant retains counsel 
himself or is appointed counsel by the court, he is entitled to effective assistance of 
counsel.53 Of course, effective assistance does not mean the best representation.54 
Indeed, a defendant can only succeed in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if 
he can show that the failure in the attorney’s performance “undermine[d] confidence 
in the result it produced.”55 In order to demonstrate ineffective counsel, the 
defendant must show (1) that his attorney failed to meet an “objective standard of 
reasonableness” and (2) there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”56 
Because this standard is famously difficult to meet, cases are rarely reversed for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.57 Thus, regardless of whether a defendant is 
represented by retained or appointed counsel, he can only succeed in challenging a 
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel if he can meet this high standard and 
show prejudice to his case.58 
Courts have emphasized the distinct nature of these rights derived from the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.59 Thus, the rights to appointed counsel, effective 
assistance of counsel, and counsel of choice are all evaluated independently using 
distinct standards.60 For example, a defendant may not have a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel—indeed, his attorney may have ably represented him—but if 
                                                          
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). 
 52  United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 53  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). 
 54  LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.7(c) (noting that the standard for effective assistance of 
counsel does not measure the attorney’s actual performance against “some model for attorney 
performance” nor does it assign a grade to the lawyer’s efforts). 
 55  Id. at § 11.7(d). 
 56  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 57  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante 
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 281 (1997) (noting that in a review of 
Illinois criminal cases, very few cases were reversed on the basis of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim). 
 58  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344-45. 
 59  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 60  Id. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/5
2017] THE REPLACEMENTS 137 
 
he requested to fire his retained counsel and hire a different attorney and that request 
was wrongfully denied, his right to counsel of choice was violated.61 The Supreme 
Court has held such a violation to constitute structural error requiring reversal and a 
new trial.62 In order to succeed on such a claim, the defendant need not prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the representation he did receive nor does 
he need to demonstrate any prejudice.63 On the other hand, a defendant who has 
appointed counsel and seeks to replace that appointed counsel with a different court-
appointed attorney can only succeed in reversing the denial of his request if he can 
show prejudice and meet the high burden of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.64   
These disparate standards are a function of the way courts view the different 
rights encompassed by the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. While the right to 
appointed counsel is seen as a means of ensuring a fair trial, the Supreme Court has 
held that the right to counsel of choice is a right distinct from ensuring the fairness of 
proceedings.65 As the Court explained,  
The right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has never been derived 
from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It has been 
regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee. Where the 
right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied, 
therefore, it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice 
inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Deprivation of the right 
is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being 
                                                          
 61  See id. at 148. 
 62  A structural error impacts the trial process in such a way that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair. Examples of structural error are the denial of the right to counsel, denial 
of the right to a jury, and denial of a public trial. See id. at 148-49. Automatic reversal for 
structural error necessarily preserves the rights of the defendant, but also can create significant 
burdens on other parties involved in the case. As the Supreme Court has noted:  
[I]nconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce 
constitutional rights of an accused: when prejudicial error is made that clearly impairs 
a defendant’s constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the 
prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less. But 
in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of 
victims. Apart from all other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to 
report violations to the proper authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one 
calling for public testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was 
involved here. Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an 
experience for the third time need not be decided now; but that factor is not to be 
ignored by the courts. The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a 
single criminal episode inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, 
records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources. 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983). 
 63  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147-48; see also Utah v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 1228 
(Utah Ct. App. 2009). 
 64  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (“[A] violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the defendant is prejudiced.”). 
 65  Id. 
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represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the 
representation he received.66   
Thus, while a defendant with an appointed attorney who wishes to choose a 
different counsel can only have his conviction reversed if he can show that he was 
prejudiced by the denial, a defendant with a retained counsel can have a conviction 
reversed merely by showing that his request to substitute counsel was wrongly 
denied, regardless of whether that denial led to ineffective assistance or prejudice.67   
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to choice of counsel has gone 
through significant changes over the last three decades. In 1988, in Wheat v. United 
States, the Court reviewed the denial of a defendant’s motion to substitute retained 
counsel prior to trial.68 In examining the right to choice of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, the Court noted “that the purpose of providing assistance of counsel ‘is 
simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial,’ and that in evaluating 
Sixth Amendment claims, ‘the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial 
process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such.’”69 In this way, 
the Court seemed to place greater weight on the defendant’s right to effective 
counsel rather than the defendant’s right to counsel of choice.70 In balancing these 
interests under the Sixth Amendment, the Court also focused on the limitations to the 
right to choice of counsel and emphasized that “[f]ederal courts have an independent 
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of 
the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”71 
Thus, while the Supreme Court acknowledged that a trial court “must recognize a 
presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice,” it gave broad discretion to 
the trial judge in making a determination on whether to allow for substitution of 
counsel.72 
The Wheat decision has been heavily cited by lower courts to support limitations 
on the right to counsel of choice and the discretion afforded to trial judges in 
determining whether to allow for substitution of retained counsel.73 Courts used 
Wheat to support their conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel served 
                                                          
 66  Id. at 147-48 (internal citations omitted). 
 67  Compare Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (“[T]hose who 
do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they 
are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.”), with Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. at 147-48 (“Where the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied, 
therefore, it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a 
Sixth Amendment violation.”). 
 68  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 154 (1988). 
 69  Id. at 158-59. 
 70  Id. at 159. 
 71  Id. at 160. 
 72  Id. at 163-64. 
 73  See, e.g., United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 198 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Gharbi, 510 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 2007). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/5
2017] THE REPLACEMENTS 139 
 
as a means to ensure a fair trial and that choice of counsel was secondary to effective 
assistance of counsel as a constitutional concern.74 
The Supreme Court revisited the right to choice of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment in 2006.75 In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court reviewed a 
case in which the trial court wrongly denied pro hac vice admission to defendant’s 
chosen counsel.76 The defendant was represented by local counsel and ultimately 
convicted.77 The defendant appealed, arguing that his right to choice of counsel was 
wrongfully denied.78 While the government conceded that the court should not have 
denied defendant’s counsel of choice admission pro hac vice, it argued that the 
denial did not prejudice the defendant, and therefore, there was no reversible error.79   
In a shift from its line of reasoning in Wheat, the majority stated that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a 
particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by 
the counsel he believes to be best.”80 Thus, the Court found that a defendant wrongly 
denied of his chosen counsel does not need to show that this denial prejudiced his 
case in any way.81 In so finding, the Court further emphasized the distinction 
between “the right to counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer 
regardless of comparative effectiveness . . . [and] the right to effective counsel—
which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen 
or appointed.”82 While the Court acknowledged the limitations on the right to 
counsel of choice and cited Wheat to support the court’s “independent interest in 
ensuring” the fairness and perceived fairness of criminal proceedings, the Court held 
that violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice was a structural 
error requiring reversal without any need to demonstrate prejudice.83 
Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, 
noted in dissent the numerous ways in which a defendant’s right to choose his own 
counsel is limited and argued that “[f]undamental unfairness does not inexorably 
follow from the denial of first-choice counsel. The ‘decision to retain a particular 
lawyer’ is ‘often uninformed,’; a defendant’s second-choice lawyer may thus turn 
out to be better than the defendant’s first-choice lawyer. More often, a defendant’s 
first- and second-choice lawyers may be simply indistinguishable.”84 Therefore, the 
                                                          
 74  See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 75  See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006). 
 76  Id. at 142. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. In Gonzalez-Lopez, the wrongful denial was the result of the trial judge erroneously 
applying state ethical rules to a motion for admission pro hac vice. Other examples of a 
wrongful denial would be a court refusing to allow a defendant his counsel of choice because 
of a non-existent conflict of interest. 
 79  Id. at 147-48. 
 80  Id. at 146. 
 81  Id. at 148. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 152. 
 84  Id. at 158 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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dissent reasoned that under the majority’s holding, a defendant who was represented 
“brilliantly” by counsel would be “automatically entitled to a new trial,” in contrast 
to a defendant represented by ineffective counsel who must show prejudice in order 
to obtain a new trial.85 To that end, “a defendant should be required to make at least 
some showing that the trial court’s erroneous ruling adversely affected the quality of 
assistance that the defendant received” in order to successfully seek reversal of his 
conviction.86 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez-Lopez and its shift from the 
reasoning of Wheat, the majority in Gonzalez-Lopez emphasized that the 2006 
decision does not “cast[] any doubt or place[] any qualification upon [its] previous 
holdings that limit the right to counsel of choice and recognize the authority of trial 
courts to establish criteria for admitting lawyers to argue before them.”87 This 
assertion has left lower courts struggling to reconcile the Wheat and Gonzalez-Lopez 
lines of authority in circumstances where the right to choice of counsel and the right 
to appointed counsel overlap.88 While most courts have found that the Gonzalez-
Lopez reasoning means that a defendant need not show any cause supporting the 
replacement of his retained counsel for appointed counsel, some courts hold that a 
defendant must demonstrate good cause in order to successfully seek such a 
substitution.89 Still, other courts have followed a different path, focusing on a court’s 
discretionary powers in reviewing a motion for continuance and viewing the 
defendant’s motion to substitute counsel through that lens.90   
III. CONFLICTING STANDARDS APPLIED TO MOTIONS TO SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
The courts have adopted clear and consistent standards to apply to motions to 
substitute counsel where the rights to appointed and choice of counsel do not 
overlap.91 However, the Supreme Court has yet to provide clear guidance on the 
standard to apply when these rights do intersect. Thus, courts have struggled to come 
up with a consistent rule when a defendant seeks to replace his retained attorney with 
appointed counsel. Consequently, courts have employed three different procedures to 
address these motions to substitute. First, some courts have found that a defendant 
                                                          
 85  Id. at 160. 
 86  Id. at 153. 
 87  Id. at 151. 
 88  United States v. Jiminez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016) (describing the 
different directions courts have gone in determining what standard to apply to cases in which a 
defendant represented by retained counsel seeks to substitute that counsel with appointed 
representation); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 1234 n.10 (Utah 2009) (describing various 
cases that have adopted different standards in these cases). 
 89  Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271. 
 90  See, e.g., United States v. Hagen, 468 F. App’x 373 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 91  Where a defendant seeks to replace retained counsel for new retained counsel, he need 
only show that the new attorney is qualified and willing to represent him, and that the 
substitution will not impact the fairness of the proceedings. See Wheat v. United States, 486 
U.S. 153, 166 (1988). Where a defendant seeks to replace appointed counsel with new 
appointed counsel, he must show good cause for the substitution. See United States v. Young, 
482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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need not show any cause to fire his retained counsel and need only demonstrate he is 
statutorily eligible to replace his attorney with appointed counsel. Second, other 
courts have required defendants to show good cause in order to succeed in a motion 
to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel. Third, many courts avoid 
employing a specific standard to address the Sixth Amendment issue, focusing 
instead on the discretionary powers afforded courts to manage their dockets and 
reject actions that will result in a delay of trial. These inconsistent standards have led 
to disparate results in the lower courts and fail to adequately protect the 
constitutional rights of the defendant along with the need for fair and efficient 
proceedings. 
A. No Showing of Cause Required: The Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Standard 
for Replacement of Retained Counsel 
Federal circuit and state appellate courts have been divided on which standard 
trial courts should use to determine whether a motion to substitute retained counsel 
for appointed counsel should be granted. In April 2016, the Eleventh Circuit joined 
the prevailing line of authority, holding that a defendant who moves to dismiss his 
retained counsel and replace her with appointed counsel need not show good cause 
for the substitution.92 The court emphasized that the right to choose counsel 
necessarily includes the right to dismiss retained counsel and reasoned, “A defendant 
exercises the right to counsel of choice when he moves to dismiss retained counsel, 
regardless of the type of counsel he wishes to engage afterward.”93 The only 
limitation the court placed on the ability of a defendant to substitute counsel was 
when such substitution would “interfere with the ‘fair, orderly and effective 
administration of the courts.’”94 
The reasoning expressed by the Eleventh Circuit mirrors that espoused by the 
Ninth Circuit in two notable cases. In the 2010 case of United States v. Rivera-
Corona, the Ninth Circuit noted, “The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 
encompasses two distinct rights: a right to adequate representation and a right to 
choose one’s own counsel.”95 In the Rivera-Corona case, the defendant sought to 
substitute counsel, and the district court rejected this request “because of the expense 
and the stage of the proceedings” at which the request was made.96 The circuit court 
found that the right to choice of counsel allows a defendant to “fire his retained or 
appointed lawyer and retain a new attorney for any reason or for no reason.”97 The 
court went on to reason that the right to counsel of choice may only be limited if the 
choice would result in undermining the “‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and 
orderly administration of justice.’”98 The court explained that these principles would 
                                                          
 92  Jiminez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267. 
 93  Id. at 1271. 
 94  Id. at 1272 (quoting United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 95  United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Daniels v. 
Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 96  Id. at 981. 
 97  Id. at 980. 
 98  Id. at 979 (quoting United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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be undermined if the substitution of counsel would result in a “significant delay or 
inefficiency.”99 
The Rivera-Corona court was particularly concerned with a trial court requiring a 
retained attorney to continue to represent a defendant who no longer wants or can 
afford the retained counsel.100 The court noted that such a situation was likely to 
cause resentment by the retained counsel and could influence her to “seek to end the 
representation as expeditiously as possible” rather than zealously advocating for the 
defendant.101 
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit reinforced its Rivera-Corona holding in United States 
v. Brown.102 In Brown, the defendant sought to substitute his retained counsel on the 
eve of trial due to a breakdown in communication and possible lack of resources.103 
The trial judge found that the defendant’s retained counsel was “reputable and 
qualified” and denied the request.104 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s 
decision and found that the trial judge violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to choice of counsel by denying his request.105 In so holding, the court 
explained succinctly the two rules espoused in the Rivera-Corona decision:  
A defendant enjoys a right to discharge his retained counsel for any 
reason ‘unless a contrary result is compelled by purposes inherent in the 
fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice,’ . . . and (2) if the 
court allows a defendant to discharge his retained counsel, and the 
defendant is financially qualified, the court must appoint new counsel for 
him under the Criminal Justice Act.106 
The court noted that the two different constitutional rights at issue in these 
cases—the right to choice of counsel and the right to appointed counsel—are 
intertwined, but that no matter the order in which the two issues are addressed, the 
defendant may not be left “without any counsel at all, absent a voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent decision to proceed pro se.”107 
                                                          
 99  Id. at 979-80. 
 100  Id. at 982. 
 101  Id. 
 102  United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 103  Id. at 1341. 
 104  Id. at 1343. 
 105  Id. at 1347. 
 106  Id. at 1340 (quoting Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979)). 
 107  Id. at 1345. Notably, “[w]hen a court denies a defendant’s request for appointment of 
new counsel or for a continuance to permit the defendant to hire new counsel, it commonly 
will inform the defendant that he either must proceed with his current counsel or represent 
himself.” LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.4(d), at 617. Frequently the defendant in this 
circumstance will choose to represent himself, finding that preferable to being represented by 
counsel in whom he no longer has confidence. Id. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds that 
the defendant’s motion to substitute counsel was erroneously denied, his decision to proceed 
as a pro se party will be held involuntary. Id. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/5
2017] THE REPLACEMENTS 143 
 
Other courts use reasoning similar to that espoused by the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuit decisions, holding that the right to choice of counsel mandates that a trial 
judge must allow for substitution of retained counsel “unless a contrary result is 
compelled by purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly administration of 
justice.”108  In Utah v. Barber, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
denial of a request to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel.109 In its 
reasoning, the court noted, “Attorneys are not fungible; often the most important 
decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.”110 
The court identified the limitations on the right to counsel of choice but held that, as 
long as the “incoming counsel is willing and ethically available,” the defendant can 
fire his retained counsel for any reason or no reason.111 The court further found that 
the defendant must show “good cause” to justify the substitution of counsel only 
when the defendant’s substitution would “obstruct the orderly procession of the 
case.”112   
Similarly, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held as a matter of first 
impression that “absent a showing of undue delay, disruption of the orderly process 
of justice or prejudice to the defendant or opposing counsel, a defendant who timely 
seeks to discharge retained counsel—whether indigency results or not—should be 
permitted to do so.”113 The Oklahoma court, thus, placed the burden on the court to 
find that there would be a disruption of the criminal justice process rather than 
requiring the defendant to show good cause supporting his motion to fire his retained 
counsel and replace him with an appointed attorney.114 
The courts have extended this rationale for replacing retained counsel with 
appointed counsel to other areas that the Sixth Amendment implicates. For example, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals noted the presumption in favor of a defendant’s right 
to choice of counsel after a trial court barred one of the defendant’s three retained 
attorneys from representing him based upon a potential conflict of interest.115 The 
Maryland appellate court reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court did not 
properly scrutinize the potential for conflict.116 While the appellate court 
acknowledged the limitations on the right to choice of counsel, it emphasized that by 
barring one of the defendant’s chosen counsel from representing him at trial, the 
                                                          
 108  Brown, 785 F.3d at 1343-44. 
 109  Utah v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). 
 110  Id. at 1233 (quoting United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 111  Id. at 1234. 
 112  Id. at 1233. 
 113  Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). 
 114  See also Colorado v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 113, 127 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[A] defendant, 
whether indigent or not, is free to discharge his or her retained counsel without having to show 
cause, and an indigent defendant may subsequently request appointed counsel, so long as the 
discharge or request is not made for improper purposes and does not significantly disrupt 
judicial proceedings.”). 
 115  Maryland v. Goldsberry, 18 A.3d 836 (Md. Ct. App. 2011). 
 116  Id. at 855. 
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court engaged in a “drastic action” violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
of choice.117   
The Colorado Court of Appeals further extended the reasoning of cases involving 
a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel to circumstances where 
a retained attorney moved to withdraw against the wishes of his client.118 In 
Colorado v. Cardenas, the trial court held an in camera hearing in the absence of the 
defendant in order to determine whether to grant his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw.119 The appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction on the basis that 
the grant of the motion to withdraw and subsequently appoint counsel without the 
defendant’s presence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.120 In 
support of its decision to apply this standard to cases in which an attorney seeks to 
withdraw against the wishes of his client, the court noted the fundamental 
importance of the right to counsel of choice in the adversarial system.121 
Thus, courts following the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit line of reasoning 
vigorously protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to choice of counsel by 
refusing to require that the defendant show any cause supporting his motion to 
substitute. These decisions place great weight on the constitutional protections 
afforded under the Sixth Amendment, finding that a trial court’s denial of such a 
motion to substitute for failure to show good cause creates a fundamental unfairness 
in the trial that leads to structural error and automatic reversal.   
B. A Showing of Good Cause Required: The First Circuit Standard for 
Substitution of Appointed for Retained Counsel 
Even some cases that have strongly protected a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice have had concurring or dissenting opinions expressing 
concern over the conflicting standards applied to defendants under the right to choice 
of counsel and the standards applied to defendants under the right to appointed 
counsel. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit case frequently cited to support the sanctity of a 
defendant’s right to choose counsel itself contained a concurrence expressing some 
reservations and exploring the different interpretations of the two rights.122   
In his concurrence in the Rivera-Corona case, Judge Fisher examined the 
difference between a defendant seeking to replace appointed counsel with appointed 
counsel, where good cause must be shown for the substitution, and a defendant 
                                                          
 117  Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals explained that, “Before a trial court is permitted to 
disqualify a criminal defendant’s privately obtained counsel (regardless of whether counsel is 
the defendant’s only attorney or one of several on the defense team), the court must conduct a 
hearing on the matter, ‘scrutinize closely the basis for the claim,’ and make evidence based-
findings to determine . . . whether there is ‘actual or serious potential for conflict’ that 
overcomes the presumption the defendant has to his or her counsel of choice.” Id. at 850 
(internal citations omitted). 
 118  Colorado v. Cardenas, No. 12CA1536, 2015 Colo. App. LEXIS 1051, 2015 WL 
4312496, at *1 (Colo. Ct. App. July 16, 2015). 
 119  Id. at *4. 
 120  Id. at *5. 
 121  Id. (“[V]iolation of a defendant’s right to choice of counsel is structural error.”). 
 122  United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fisher, J., 
concurring). 
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seeking to replace existing counsel with retained counsel, where good cause need not 
be shown unless the substitution would result in a delay.123 The concurrence then 
noted the law is not so clear when a defendant seeks to substitute a retained counsel 
for an appointed counsel.124 The judge argued that prior Ninth Circuit precedent 
mandated a finding that a defendant must demonstrate good cause for a substitution 
of counsel under the doctrine of stare decisis.125 At the same time, however, the 
concurring judge indicated that good arguments supported abandoning that standard 
in favor of the one adopted by the majority.126 In its analysis, the concurrence 
described the conflicting lines of authority addressing these circumstances.127 Some 
courts, like the Ninth Circuit, hold “that a defendant can freely discharge and obtain 
appointed counsel without establishing good cause.”128 But other courts have held 
that a defendant seeking to replace any counsel with appointed counsel must show 
good cause for the substitution.129   
The First Circuit falls into this latter line of authority, holding that a defendant 
who seeks to substitute his retained counsel with appointed counsel must show good 
cause for doing so.130 In United States v. Mota-Santana, the First Circuit held that a 
defendant who sought to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel must 
support his motion by showing that the conflict he alleged with his retained counsel 
“‘was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an 
adequate defense.’”131 The First Circuit reasoned that, when a defendant seeks to fire 
his retained counsel and have counsel appointed, “the two actions merge” and 
therefore the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate good cause as to why the 
court should permit him to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel.132   
It is interesting to note that those courts that have required a showing of good 
cause before allowing the substitution of retained counsel for appointed counsel have 
continued to do so even after the Gonzalez-Lopez decision. In April of 2016, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that “[t]he right 
to counsel of choice ‘does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be 
appointed for them.’”133 The court further noted that as long a defendant is “afforded 
                                                          
 123  Id. at 984. 
 124  Id. at 985. 
 125  Id. at 987. 
 126  Id. (noting that there are “a number of strong arguments for the proposition that the 
replacement of retained with appointed counsel should not require a showing of good cause”). 
 127  Id. at 985. 
 128  Id. at 985. 
 129  Id. (noting that the opposing line of authority “perhaps reflect[s] the principle that ‘the 
right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed 
for them’”). 
 130  United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id.  
 133  Fluker v. United States, No. 13C7643, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53823, 2016 WL 
1613464, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 753 F.3d 671, 675 
(7th Cir. 2014)). 
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adequate representation, an erroneous denial of a motion for substitution is not 
prejudicial and is therefore harmless.”134 The Fifth Circuit has likewise recently held 
that a “defendant does not have an absolute right to counsel of his choice. Instead, 
good cause must exist for the withdrawal of counsel.”135   
There are several factors that have led courts to disagree over the standard to 
apply where a defendant seeks to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel. 
First and foremost, because the language of the Sixth Amendment does not contain 
any specific reference to either right, courts have broad latitude to interpret the way 
these rights compare and overlap.136 As a result of this lack of constitutional 
guidance, courts struggle with determining the relative weight to place on the right to 
choice of counsel versus the right to appointed counsel. Courts that have found a 
defendant need not show any reason for the substitution of counsel have placed 
fewer restrictions and, therefore, greater weight on the right to choice of counsel by 
allowing the defendant to reverse the denial of a substitution of counsel simply by 
showing that the denial occurred. On the other hand, courts that place equivalent 
restrictions on a defendant seeking to substitute retained counsel and a defendant 
seeking to substitute appointed counsel appear to give equal weight to the two rights. 
Additional factors that have led courts to disagree on the standards applied relate 
to the practical difficulties that arise when a defendant seeks to replace counsel. On 
the one hand, by placing no burden on a defendant seeking to substitute retained 
counsel, courts emphasize the importance of a defendant’s ability to strategize his 
own defense. These courts note the difficulties that arise when a retained counsel is 
forced to continue his representation of a criminal defendant despite his client’s 
wishes or resources.137 On the other hand, by imposing a burden on defendants 
seeking to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel, courts emphasize the 
need for a fair trial and the efficacy of the attorney as a safeguard in ensuring 
fairness. Requiring defendants to show good cause for the substitution of counsel in 
these cases also recognizes the sheer number of criminal defendants represented by 
appointed counsel and the dissatisfaction that many criminal defendants have with 
their attorneys leading to frequent requests for new counsel.138 Concerns over 
judicial efficiency and the struggle of trial judges to maintain their calendars have 
                                                          
 134  Id. at *8. 
 135  United States v. Austin, 812 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 136  Indeed, the broad language of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel has required the 
courts to determine what, exactly, the right to counsel entails. As discussed supra Part I, over 
the course of the last century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to counsel to include 
the right to choice of counsel, the right to effective assistance of counsel, and the right to 
appointed counsel. See also Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Criminal Law-Prejudiced by the Prejudice 
Prong: Proposing a New Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Wyoming After 
Osborne v. State, 2012 Wy 123, 285 P.3d 248 (Wyo. 2012), 14 WYO. L. REV. 161, 162-63 
(2014). 
 137  See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[R]equiring a retained counsel to continue to represent the defendant even if the defendant 
cannot pay him and no longer wants him . . . is no substitute for appointed counsel paid with 
public funds and so could not, without more, be in the ‘interests of justice.’”). 
 138  United States v. White, 174 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It would be an 
understatement to observe that disputes” between attorneys and clients arise often, and that 
motions to substitute counsel are often the result of those disputes.”). 
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led these courts to require defendants to demonstrate why they wish to substitute 
retained counsel for appointed counsel before allowing for such a substitution. 
C.  Avoiding a Constitutional Standard: Examining the Substitution of Counsel 
Through Rules Governing Discretionary Powers Afforded Courts to Grant or  
Deny Continuances 
Perhaps in an attempt to reconcile these conflicting values, some courts avoid 
analyzing cases involving the substitution of counsel under Sixth Amendment 
standards. While these courts acknowledge the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
to choice of counsel, they focus their analysis on the discretion afforded trial courts 
in granting continuances that are frequently necessary when a motion to substitute is 
granted.139 By focusing on the law governing a motion to continue, these courts 
avoid addressing whether the defendant needs to show cause to substitute counsel.140 
Under this discretionary framework, the decision of a trial court to refuse a motion to 
continue and the consequent denial of the motion to substitute are rarely reversed.141 
A trial court has great discretion in maintaining its calendar and ensuring the 
efficient administration of justice.142 Because trial judges are balancing multiple 
cases, motions, pleas, and hearings, they must necessarily be afforded the flexibility 
to achieve the goal of ensuring a fair and effective process by balancing those needs 
and setting limits on timing for lawyers, defendants, and other participants in the 
trial process.143    
One way in which parties can have an influence over the scheduling of the 
pretrial and trial process is by moving for a continuance.144 This happens frequently 
in criminal trials, and prosecutors and defense attorneys alike can file motions for 
continuance.145 Continuances are often sought to ensure witness availability, allow 
for more discovery, give time for plea negotiations to take place, and countless other 
reasons.146 One of the numerous reasons defendants seek a continuance is to give 
                                                          
 139  See, e.g., Washington v. Aguirre, 229 P.3d 669, 676-77 (Wash. 2010) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that his right to choice of counsel was violated by denying a request for 
a continuance). 
 140  See, e.g., United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 815-16 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting the 
discretion afforded trial courts in denying motions to continue). 
 141  LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 11.4(b), at 613-14. 
 142  Id.; see also John P. Coffey, Motion for Continuance, 74 GEO. L.J. 681, 682-83 (1986) 
(“A trial court's ruling [denial of a motion to continue] will not be disturbed unless the 
defendant shows clear abuse of discretion that results in specific prejudice.”). 
 143  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (“Trial judges necessarily require a great deal 
of latitude in scheduling trials.”). 
 144  CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL MOTIONS § 1:6 (2015) (noting in the practice notes that 
“[w]hether for the prosecution or the defense, a motion to continue is often the most important 
motion that can be made in a criminal case”). 
 145  See id. 
 146  Celeste Bacchi, Continuances in Criminal Cases, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/continuances-criminal-cases.html (last viewed Nov. 20, 2016). 
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their attorneys more time to prepare for trial.147 This need can often be the result of 
the appointment or hiring of new counsel just prior to trial.148 
Because a motion to substitute counsel prior to trial frequently leads to the need 
for a continuance in order to allow the new attorney time to prepare, judges often use 
their discretionary powers to deny such requests.149 On review, many appellate 
courts downplay the constitutional implications of these denials, focusing instead on 
the discretion afforded trial judges in granting or denying a continuance.150 
The Fourth Circuit examined the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to 
substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel through the lens of the law on 
continuances in United States v. Hagen.151 In Hagen, the defendant fired one retained 
attorney and replaced him with another.152 After the relationship with his second 
attorney deteriorated, the defendant moved to substitute the retained counsel with 
appointed counsel and to postpone the trial in order to allow the appointed counsel 
time to prepare.153 The trial judge denied both requests, finding that it would take the 
new attorney six months to prepare for trial, at which point the defendant would 
likely request a new attorney.154 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial court’s 
denial of the defendant’s request was based upon an implicit finding that the request 
was “at least in part a ‘transparent ploy for delay.’”155 Although the trial court never 
explicitly stated that the defendant sought to substitute counsel as a mere delay 
tactic, the Fourth Circuit found that such a determination could be read into the 
colloquy between the court and the defendant, and this allowed the court to 
distinguish the case from Rivera-Corona.156 The appellate court noted the high bar 
for abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a continuance and found that in this 
                                                          
 147  LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.4(b). 
 148  See Bacchi, supra note 146. 
 149  LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.4(b). 
 150  See, e.g., United States v. Hagen, 468 F. App’x 373 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 151  Id. at 375. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. at 375. 
 154  Id. at 379. Specifically, the trial judge told the defendant: 
[I]f I were to allow you to discharge Mr. Meier[,] . . . appoint another lawyer and 
continue the case, it would take six months for that lawyer to get up to snuff and be 
ready for trial. Now, at the end of that six months I’ll be having another motion by 
David Hagen wanting another lawyer because that lawyer too does not want to do it 
like you want it done . . . You’ve had two privately retained lawyers now that you 
can’t get along with and you want the court to appoint you a third one, and I’m not 
going to do it. I’m going to deny the motion, both motions. You either make peace 
with your lawyer or, Mr. Meier, when we go to trial a month from today, if Mr. Hagen 
insists on going pro se, you’ll be standby counsel. 
Id. 
 155  Id. at 384. 
 156  Id. at 384-86.  
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case that bar had not been met.157 In so doing, the court found that the defendant’s 
right to choice of counsel had not been wrongfully denied.158 
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
examined whether the denial of a defendant’s request to substitute counsel was 
erroneous and found that it was not based upon an application of the rules governing 
a motion for a continuance.159 In Abby v. Prelesnik, the district court reviewed a 
habeas petition filed by a defendant who sought to replace retained counsel with 
appointed counsel prior to trial.160 The trial judge denied the request and the 
defendant appealed, asserting a violation of his right to choice of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment.161  The state appeals court affirmed, noting that the trial date “had 
been scheduled for nearly five months and the [defendant] had another attorney who 
was ready and able to represent his interests.”162 In its habeas review, the district 
court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez-Lopez that the 
wrongful deprivation of the right to choice of counsel is structural error leading to 
reversal.163 However, the court noted that there are limitations on that right and one 
of those limitations is the trial court’s need for flexibility in scheduling and 
maintaining an efficient calendar.164 As the court explained,  
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling 
trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, 
lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden 
counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. 
Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of 
continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the 
right to the assistance of counsel.165   
The court reasoned that because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
refusing to delay the date of trial, the defendant’s right to choice of counsel was not 
erroneously denied.166 
The right to choice of counsel is also implicated in cases where a defendant seeks 
to replace appointed counsel with retained counsel.167 Just as in cases where a 
                                                          
 157  Id. at 387 (“A trial court abuses its discretion when its denial of a motion for 
continuance is an ‘unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a 
justifiable request for delay.”) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).  
 158  Id. at 387. 
 159  Abby v. Prelesnik, No. 08-15333, 2012 WL 1019169, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40472 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 160  Id.  
 161  Id. at *3-4. 
 162  Id. at *10. 
 163  Id. at *7. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. at *8 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 166  Id. 
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defendant seeks to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel, in cases where 
the defendant seeks retained counsel, courts have grappled with concerns over the 
constitutional right to counsel of choice as balanced against the concerns for fairness 
and scheduling. 
For example, in Washington v. Hampton, the Supreme Court of Washington 
reviewed a trial judge’s decision to deny a defendant’s request to delay trial after 
granting his request to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel on the day 
of trial.168 The court acknowledged the Sixth Amendment rights at issue in the case 
but noted that the defendant’s right to counsel of choice is limited by “the trial 
court’s need to efficiently administer justice.”169 The court referenced the Supreme 
Court’s Gonzalez-Lopez decision and noted that the Supreme Court did not provide 
guidance on how to determine whether a defendant was erroneously deprived of his 
right to choice of counsel.170 However, the Hampton court held that the high court 
“did not limit the factors that trial courts can consider when balancing a defendant’s 
right to choice of counsel and a trial court’s need to manage its calendar.”171 Thus, 
the Hampton court, in determining whether to grant a motion for continuance, 
examined various well-established factors, including the length of the continuance, 
the timing of the request, whether previous motions to continue had been granted, 
and “whether the continuance would seriously inconvenience witnesses.”172 
After examining the trial court’s reasoning for denying the motion for 
continuance, the state high court held that the denial was not an abuse of discretion, 
                                                                                                                                         
 167  See, e.g., Washington v. Hampton, 361 P.3d 734, 736 (Wash. 2015). 
 168  Id. at 736. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 738. 
 171  Id. at 737-38. 
 172  Id. at 740. The factors cited by the court to consider in determining a motion for 
continuance include: 
1) whether the request came at a point sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the 
trial court to readily adjust its calendar; 
2) the length of the continuance requested; 
3) whether the continuance would carry the trial date beyond the period specified 
in the state speedy trial act;  
4) whether the court had granted previous continuances at the defendant’s request; 
5) whether the continuance would seriously inconvenience the witnesses; 
6) whether the continuance request was made promptly after the defendant first 
became aware of the grounds advanced for discharging his or her counsel; 
7) whether the defendant’s own negligence placed him or her in a situation where 
he or she needed a continuance to obtain new counsel; 
8) whether the defendant had some legitimate cause for dissatisfaction with 
counsel, even though it fell short of likely incompetent representation; 
9) whether there was a “rational basis” for believing that the defendant was seeking 
to change counsel “primarily for the purpose of delay”; 
10) whether the current counsel was prepared to go to trial; 
11) whether denial of the motion was likely to result in identifiable prejudice to the 
defendant’s case of a material or substantial nature.   
Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 11.4(c)). 
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and there was, therefore, no erroneous denial of the right to choice of counsel.173 
Worth noting is the vigorous dissent, which argued that the factors the court relied 
upon “overvalue the right to appointed counsel at the expense of the right to retained 
counsel and therefore violate the rule that the right to appointed counsel is a 
corollary of the Constitution’s principal right to retain counsel of choice.”174 The 
dissent also asserted that the court’s consideration of the “convenience factors” did 
not properly express that “slight inconvenience alone cannot outweigh the 
fundamental constitutional right to retain counsel of choice.”175 
Significantly, even where the defendant does not explicitly request a 
continuance, courts have found that a motion to substitute counsel was not 
erroneously denied based upon the discretion afforded courts in granting motions to 
continue.176 In Hyatt v. Baker, the defendant moved to substitute retained counsel for 
appointed counsel during jury selection.177 The court denied the motion, finding that 
implicit in the motion was “a prospective motion to continue the case” and further 
finding that the defendant’s appointed counsel was not shown to be ineffective.178 
The state high court found that the effectiveness of the attorney was irrelevant to an 
examination of a claimed violation to the right to choice of counsel. However, the 
court held the trial court had not erroneously denied the substitution request because 
the request contained an implicit motion to continue and the trial court was within its 
discretion to deny such a motion.179 In its review of the habeas petition, the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the state court’s ruling, noting “a trial court maintains ‘wide latitude 
in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against 
the demands of its calendar.’”180 The federal court rejected the defendant’s 
contention that a continuance was neither necessary nor implicit in his request to 
substitute counsel, finding that the evidence he provided of this was “insufficient to 
overcome the trial court’s finding that a motion to continue was ‘implicit’ in [the 
defendant’s] motion to change attorneys.”181 In so holding, the district court relied 
                                                          
 173  Id. at 741. In considering the defendant’s request, the trial court noted that he knew the 
defendant’s counsel was “‘a very capable attorney. It wouldn’t be the first time he’s 
represented someone who may not have always been happy with [him].’ The trial judge 
further stated ‘I think that happens for most of the defense attorneys that they occasionally 
have a client who would rather have a different attorney appointed.  I don’t think that would in 
any way impair [the attorney’s] ability to represent his client zealously and capably, and I 
don’t think there’s any question that [the attorney] is a highly qualified criminal defense 
attorney.’” Id. (alterations in original). 
 174  Id. at 742-43. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 173 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 177  Id. at 171. 
 178  Id. at 171-72. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006)). 
 181  Id. at 173. 
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upon the experience of the trial judge in overseeing trials and understanding the 
nature of the case and the time it would take an attorney to prepare for trial.182 
Similarly, the Kansas Court of Appeals found a defendant’s motion to substitute 
counsel contained an “implicit” request to continue the case and, therefore, held that 
denial of the motion was within the trial court’s discretion.183 In Kansas v. Andrews, 
the defendant sought to replace his appointed counsel with retained counsel on the 
first day of trial, indicating that he had more confidence in retained counsel and that 
he did not previously have the money to hire retained counsel.184 The trial judge 
denied the defendant’s motion, “noting the imposition that the delay would cause the 
parties, the jury, and the court staff.”185 The court of appeals acknowledged that the 
defendant did not explicitly request a continuance, but found that “the need for a 
continuance was implicit in the request for new counsel on the day of trial.”186 The 
appellate court then went on to examine the denial of the defendant’s request under 
the law governing denials of motions to continue.187 In examining the case under the 
standards of a motion to continue, the court distinguished Gonzalez-Lopez—finding 
that the denial of the implicit motion to continue was not erroneous because the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying an implicit request for continuance.188 In 
so holding, the court noted that while the record did not reflect whether a 
continuance would inconvenience the court, witnesses, counsel, or other parties, the 
burden was on the defendant to establish an abuse of discretion. By failing to 
establish any inconvenience, the defendant did not meet that burden.189 Thus, despite 
the absence of a motion to continue or any evidence of inconvenience if such a 
motion had been filed, the court found that the trial court’s denial of the motion to 
substitute was not an abuse of discretion. 
                                                          
 182  Id. (“The trial court properly drew on its experience in determining whether a motion to 
change counsel in the midst of a capital case involving two victims, two murder charges, and 
two different accomplices would require a delay of the trial. Given these facts, the trial court 
could reasonably believe that, in order to be effective, any new attorney would require a 
continuance after undertaking the defense. In such a complicated and weighty case, new 
counsel would undoubtedly need time to study the state’s allegations and evidence, the 
procedural history of the case, and—in consultation with the accused—formulate a defense 
strategy.”) (emphasis in original). 
 183  State v. Andrews, No. 102,367, 2011 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 265, at *2 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2011) (unpublished table decision). 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id.  
 187  Id. at *3. The factors examined by the court were derived from Kansas v. Anthony, 898 
P.3d 1109 (Kan. 1999), and included “(1) whether a continuance would inconvenience 
witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; (2) whether other continuances have been granted; 
(3) whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; (4) whether the delay is the fault of the 
defendant; and (5) whether the denial of a continuance would prejudice the defendant.” Id. 
 188  Id. at *8 (“In essence, this court, unlike the Gonzalez-Lopez Court, is required to 
determine whether the district court’s deprivation of Andrews’ right to counsel of choice was 
wrongful.  The Anthony factors, aside from perhaps the prejudice factor, guide this 
determination.”). 
 189  Id. at *4. 
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By focusing on the standards and discretion applicable to a motion for 
continuance, even in circumstances where no such motion was filed, courts avoid the 
rigid application of the Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel, a violation of 
which would automatically lead to reversal and retrial. The discretion afforded trial 
judges to preserve their schedules, prevent the inconvenience of witnesses and other 
participants, and ensure the efficient administration of justice affords lower courts 
wide latitude in denying requests to delay trial.190 By finding that whenever a 
defendant seeks to substitute counsel it is likely that a continuance also will be 
necessary, the courts can review the motion to substitute counsel through the lens of 
this discretionary standard. In so doing, trial judges can avoid a finding that the 
denial of a motion to substitute was erroneous and a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment with a simple determination that the defendant failed to show the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. Thus, the bar is 
extremely high for a defendant to show the violation of a constitutional right deemed 
fundamental to our criminal justice system. Yet, courts regularly employ the high bar 
to avoid reversing a lower court’s denial of a motion to substitute counsel on Sixth 
Amendment grounds. 
The reason that reviewing courts examine these denials through the lens of a 
motion to continue is likely related to the practical realities of criminal trial practices 
expressed in many of these cases. Courts must balance the defendant’s desire for 
new counsel against the needs of the judicial system to “efficiently administer 
justice.”191 In so doing, the court must consider its own schedule, the schedules of 
the attorneys involved in the case, and the inconvenience to witnesses.192 Because 
“[a]ny substitution of counsel will ‘almost certainly necessitate a last-minute 
continuance,’”193 courts often determine that the substitution necessarily conflicts 
with “the public’s interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of 
justice”194 thereby justifying a denial of the request. 
The disparity in the standards that courts use to address situations in which the 
right to choice of counsel and the right to appointed counsel overlap demonstrates 
the need for the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue. Without such guidance, 
lower courts are left struggling to determine what a defendant must show in order to 
replace his attorney. The consequence of a failure to get the standard right is 
significant: the violation of the right to choice of counsel is a structural error 
requiring a new trial. Thus, a clear rule needs to be established that protects the 
fundamental right to choice of counsel while also preserving judicial efficiency and 
fairness.  
                                                          
 190  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). 
 191  Washington v. Hampton, 361 P.3d 734, 662 (Wash. 2015). 
 192  “Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the 
least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same 
place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling 
reasons.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 11; see also Abby v. Prelesnik, No. 08-15333, 2012 WL 
1019169, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40472, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 193  Cobb v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 466 F. App’x 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Whitfield, 259 F. App’x 830, 834 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 194  State v. Andrews, No. 102,367, 2011 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 265, at *2 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2011) (unpublished table decision). 
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IV. DEVELOPING A CLEARER STANDARD FOR CASES INVOLVING THE  
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
The lower courts’ conflicting standards for evaluating the denial of a motion to 
substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel reflect the challenges presented to 
trial courts in trying to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to choice of 
counsel while at the same time ensuring the efficiency and efficacy of the criminal 
justice process. As discussed, the Supreme Court itself has demonstrated the struggle 
to balance these two competing interests in their cases addressing the substitution of 
counsel. In Wheat, the Court emphasized the need to allow trial courts the latitude to 
ensure that their calendar needs were met and that “legal proceedings appear fair to 
all who observe them.”195 Eighteen years later, in the Gonzalez-Lopez decision, the 
Court emphasized the fundamental nature of the defendant’s right to choice of 
counsel and noted that this right was independent of the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.196 The Gonzalez-Lopez majority took care to note that the decision did not alter 
its previous opinions on the limitations to the right to counsel of choice. However, it 
did not provide clear guidance on how lower courts should resolve competing 
interests when confronted with a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed 
counsel.197 
If, as the Supreme Court stated in Gonzalez-Lopez, the Sixth Amendment 
“commands . . . that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the 
accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best[,]”198 such a right should 
not be easily undercut by mere anticipation of delay in trial proceedings. And yet, 
trial courts must maintain some flexibility in denying such requests when granting 
the requests would lead to unreasonable delay or cause significant inconvenience to 
those involved with the proceedings. 
The Court could promote both interests by establishing a standard that protects 
the distinct right to counsel of choice without undermining the court’s interest in 
efficiency. Such a standard must reject the automatic requirement for a defendant to 
show cause when he chooses to fire his retained counsel and seeks appointed 
counsel. As the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s precedent holds, because the right to 
counsel of choice is a fundamental right, independent of the right to a fair trial, 
courts cannot and should not place on defendants the burden of establishing good 
reasons for hiring or firing retained counsel.199 As long as a defendant can show that 
he is eligible for appointed counsel, the defendant need not meet any additional 
standard to show that the motion to substitute should be granted.200 Thus, on appeal, 
the defendant need not show he was prejudiced by the denial of a request to 
substitute in order to succeed.201 Eliminating the defendant’s requirement to show 
                                                          
 195  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). 
 196  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006). 
 197  Id. at 151-52. 
 198  Id. at 146. 
 199  See, e.g., Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151; United States v. Jiminez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 
1267, 1271 (2016). 
 200  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151. 
 201  Id. 
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cause clearly protects the presumption in favor of the defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice. 
At the same time, this presumption of defendant’s right to counsel must be 
rebuttable in order to satisfy the need of trial courts for flexibility and latitude in 
maintaining their calendar and assessing scheduling interests. The burden to rebut 
the presumption of the defendant’s right to counsel of choice should be placed on the 
trial court. The presumption could be overcome by demonstrating, for the record, the 
delay and inconvenience that the substitution would cause. This explanation should 
be done in open court with the participation of the defendant and all counsel 
involved in the case. Once the trial court has established a clear factual record 
showing the likely impact that a substitution would cause, discretion to deny the 
motion to substitute should lie with the trial court. The defendant should have the 
opportunity to contest the findings of the court. However, the ultimate decision on 
the motion would fall within the trial judge’s discretion. Without factual findings on 
the record clearly indicating the negative impact of the substitution, the presumption 
would remain with the defendant, and a denial of the motion would be an abuse of 
discretion.  
This standard formalizes many of the standards and strategies that lower courts 
currently employ to address cases involving motions to substitute. By requiring the 
trial judge to make clear findings on the record as to why the judge should deny a 
motion to substitute, the standard forces trial courts to carefully examine whether the 
substitution would lead to a delay in proceedings that would disrupt the trial process 
rather than simply making the assumption that such an action would lead to a 
disruptive result. This standard also provides protection for the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights by removing any burden on the defendant to support or explain 
his choice to replace counsel. Finally, the standard ensures that the criminal justice 
process is not only fair but also has the appearance of fairness by requiring 
transparency and support for a judge’s decision to reject a motion to substitute.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The current conflicting standards that lower courts utilize to address a 
defendant’s motion to substitute counsel reflect confusion over how to balance a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel with the need for a fair and 
efficient system of justice. Some courts have chosen to utilize the standards 
employed with the replacement of appointed counsel for different appointed counsel. 
Those courts have required a defendant to show good cause when he seeks to fire his 
retained counsel and replace her with appointed counsel. Other courts, recognizing 
the fundamental importance of the right to choice of counsel, have held that the 
defendant need not shoulder any burden of proof when firing his retained counsel. 
Those courts have held that a defendant may fire his retained counsel for any reason 
or no reason and may receive appointed counsel as long as he is statutorily eligible.    
To establish constitutional consistency in this area, this conflict must be resolved 
in favor of the latter line of cases. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant’s 
right to choice of counsel is a right independent of the right to a fair trial, so a 
defendant need not show any prejudice or impact on the outcome of the case to 
support a finding that his right to choose retained counsel was violated.   
While the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant must be preserved, so too 
must the discretion of the trial court to maintain its administrative calendar. In order 
for a system of justice to work effectively and be perceived as fair to all, it must 
ensure that the trial process is efficient and not unduly inconvenient to all 
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participants. In order to protect this need, trial judges must be given great latitude in 
preventing unreasonable delays. By allowing the trial judge discretion to grant or 
deny a substitution request based upon the demands of the court calendar, such 
efficiency and fairness (both real and perceived) will be preserved. However, in 
order to ensure that there is, in fact, a real danger of a disruption to the court calendar 
or inconvenience to witnesses, the court should and must make findings of fact on 
the record to that effect, and the defendant must have an opportunity to respond. 
Once a trial judge has made such explicit findings and rejected the defendant’s 
motion to substitute, an appellate court should only overturn his decision if it meets 
the high burden of the abuse of discretion standard. Consequently, a judge cannot 
simply predict or assume that a substitution of counsel would lead to a motion to 
continue the trial, but the court must make explicit findings as to why delay is likely. 
With the current lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the clear circuit 
split, neither courts nor defendants and their attorneys know the circumstances under 
which a motion to substitute will be granted. Should the Court adopt a standard such 
as that proposed in this Article, it would preserve the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice and ensure that the trial court continues to have great discretion in 
managing its calendar. The proposed standard would help provide clearer guidance 
to trial courts on how to handle motions to substitute.    
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